Arch's own advisory: AUR packages have shipped real malware more than once
All three incident dates hold against their primary sources, read in full: the acroread thread is dated July 8, 2018 on lists.archlinux.org, the RAT thread is dated July 18, 2025 and says the uploads happened on 16 July and the packages were deleted on 18 July, and the news post carries datePublished 2026-06-12 by Campbell Jones. The wiki warning is quoted verbatim from the Arch_User_Repository page, which also names aur-general as used for security warnings and links seven incident threads, so the record understates rather than overstates. Gate 2 fails on the advisory: the record says Arch 'temporarily disabled' new accounts, updates and adoption, and the danger calls it 'a temporary lockdown on the AUR itself', but the advisory says only that 'users may see issues with the following' while a more permanent solution is built, and never says disabled. The danger's claim that Arch's response to each incident was 'a mailing list post and a temporary lockdown' is unsupported for 2018 and 2025, where the thread records deletion of the packages and no lockdown. Omarchy ships yay and not paru: pacman -Q yay is 13.0.1-1 here, paru is not installed, and install/omarchy-base.packages carries yay at line 147 on this machine and byte-identical at the v4.0.2 tag commit 346e69e1. The line number was removed from the prose because quattro HEAD already has it at line 150. The record misses the Omarchy-specific fact that matters: bin/omarchy-pkg-aur-install, which the menu's Install then AUR entry runs, ends in yay -S --noconfirm, and bin/omarchy-update-aur-pkgs runs yay -Sua --noconfirm, both identical between this machine and the v4.0.2 commit, so on both stock paths yay's diff menu never appears whatever diffmenu is set to, and the verify's config.json check answered the wrong question. The picker does offer the PKGBUILD by alt-b through yay -Gpa before selection, and the corrected fix says so. yay 13.0.1 also overlays init.lua on config.json per doc/lua.md, so the verify now reads yay -Pg. Severity moved to medium: pacman -Qm is empty on this stock install, no default reaches the AUR, and a malicious package needs the user to pick it, so no default leaves a credential or privilege boundary exposed. Gate 1 passes on Arch's own advisory and list, gate 3 passes because the record names deleted packages and reproduces neither the compromised commit the 2018 thread links nor how either payload worked. Nothing was exercised: no package was fetched or built and no yay command was run beyond --version.
A high vote count, a quiet comment section, or a maintainer name that sounds familiar are not security signals. None of them are cryptographic, and none of them stopped the incidents this record cites. Each was caught after the fact by a person reading the package and writing to aur-general, and Arch's 2026 advisory asks users to keep doing exactly that. On Omarchy the two stock paths, the menu's AUR installer and omarchy update, both run yay with --noconfirm, so yay's own diff review never appears there whatever your yay configuration says, and a package you did not read before selecting it is a package you did not read.
Symptom
is it safe to install packages from the AUR, has the AUR actually ever shipped malware or is that just a rumour
Cause
The AUR is unmoderated user submitted content, and Arch says so on its own wiki: "AUR packages are user-produced content. These PKGBUILDs are completely unofficial and have not been thoroughly vetted. Any use of the provided files is at your own risk." That is not a hypothetical. Arch's own aur-general mailing list and its own news page record real, dated incidents, not a single one. A package named acroread was reported compromised on 2018-07-08. Three packages, named firefox-patch-bin, librewolf-fix-bin and zen-browser-patched-bin, were uploaded on 2025-07-16, reported on the list on 2025-07-18 as installing a remote access trojan, and deleted the same day. Arch published its own advisory, titled "Active AUR malicious packages incident" and dated 2026-06-12, stating: "We are currently experiencing a high volume of malicious package adoptions and updates in the Arch User Repository," and warned that while it worked on a more permanent solution users "may see issues with" creating new AUR accounts, pushing package updates, and adopting or creating new packages. The wiki's own warning links seven such threads. Omarchy installs yay, an AUR helper, from its own base package list (install/omarchy-base.packages) on every stock install, so a stock Omarchy desktop already has the tool that reaches this content. The stock install itself carries no AUR package (pacman -Qm is empty on a fresh 4.0.2-1), so AUR content reaches a machine only when the user asks for it, and two of the stock ways of asking, the Omarchy menu's Install then AUR entry and omarchy update, run yay with --noconfirm, which skips yay's diff menu entirely.
Fix
Read the PKGBUILD and any .install files yourself before every AUR install or update, rather than trusting a vote count or an empty comment section. The companion record pkgbuild-review-before-building-from-aur covers exactly what to look at and what yay's diff and edit menus do and do not show you by default.
On Omarchy, know which of the stock paths shows you anything. The menu's Install then AUR entry runs omarchy-pkg-aur-install, whose picker has an alt-b binding that prints the package's PKGBUILD in the preview pane (yay -Gpa). Read it there, because the install that follows your selection is yay -S --noconfirm and prints no diff. omarchy update runs yay -Sua --noconfirm for every installed AUR package and prints no diff either. To see a diff before an update, run yay yourself:
yay -Sua
Subscribe to the channel Arch's own wiki names as the one used for security warnings in the past:
https://lists.archlinux.org/mailman3/lists/aur-general.lists.archlinux.org/
Do not treat a package that just changed maintainer through "adoption" as more trustworthy than a brand new one. Arch's 2026-06-12 advisory named "malicious package adoptions and updates" as the problem and said: "We continue to encourage all users of AUR packages to review all PKGBUILD and install script changes when updating, especially during this time." A freshly adopted package gets the same review as a package you have never seen before, not less.
A review lowers the risk. It does not make the package safe: a PKGBUILD you read and understood can still fetch a compromised upstream archive, which is why the wiki tells you to look hardest at the parts that "pull software code from outside the repositories."
Verify
Confirm which of your install paths will show you a diff, since the fix above depends on knowing that. On Omarchy 4.0.2-1 both stock scripts pass --noconfirm, so expect two hits:
grep -n -- '--noconfirm' /usr/share/omarchy/bin/omarchy-pkg-aur-install /usr/share/omarchy/bin/omarchy-update-aur-pkgs
For yay run by hand, print the configuration yay is actually using. This reflects ~/.config/yay/config.json and ~/.config/yay/init.lua, which overlays it:
yay -Pg | grep -E '"(diffmenu|editmenu)"'
yay 13.0.1's built in defaults are diffmenu true and editmenu false. See the companion PKGBUILD review record for what that default does and does not catch.
Sources
- https://archlinux.org/news/active-aur-malicious-packages-incident/
- https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository
- https://lists.archlinux.org/archives/list/aur-general@lists.archlinux.org/thread/FFCMZGL4UQODYKZGUY7KTN3UBF3XN66P/
- https://lists.archlinux.org/archives/list/aur-general@lists.archlinux.org/thread/7EZTJXLIAQLARQNTMEW2HBWZYE626IFJ/
- https://github.com/omacom/omarchy/blob/346e69e1cec6c4e8924531874af6ba010a1bc99e/install/omarchy-base.packages
- https://github.com/omacom/omarchy/blob/346e69e1cec6c4e8924531874af6ba010a1bc99e/bin/omarchy-pkg-aur-install
- https://github.com/omacom/omarchy/blob/346e69e1cec6c4e8924531874af6ba010a1bc99e/bin/omarchy-update-aur-pkgs
- https://github.com/omacom/omarchy/blob/346e69e1cec6c4e8924531874af6ba010a1bc99e/default/omarchy/omarchy-menu.jsonc
- https://github.com/Jguer/yay/blob/02fb6ba948720d2d7eae6e5989168a297710a3e4/doc/lua.md
- https://github.com/Jguer/yay/blob/02fb6ba948720d2d7eae6e5989168a297710a3e4/doc/yay.8