Make the fingerprint reader authenticate sudo, polkit and the lock screen
Every command and PAM snippet is sourced correctly. The pam_unix/pam_fprintd sufficient pair, the system-local-login stanza, the enrol-all-fingers brace-expansion loop and the polkit 50-default.rules copy are all verbatim from Arch Fprint (lines 52-95 and 165-178). But the wiki carries an explicit warning immediately above the stanza this record reproduces, and the record drops it: 'This setting (fingerprint-only authentication) is a security breach if used for su, polkit, or sudo as it allows background processes to obtain permissions without prompting the user for a fingerprint (via fingerprint hijacking). See CVE-2024-37408.' Handing a user a /etc/pam.d/sudo edit with no mention of that, and no mention that a typo in that file locks them out of sudo entirely, is dangerous-without-warning. nullok is also carried over unnecessarily and permits empty passwords.
Adding pam_fprintd.so as sufficient to sudo/su/polkit is a documented security weakness (CVE-2024-37408): a background process can obtain elevated permissions when you touch the reader for something else. Editing PAM incorrectly can lock you out of the system entirely. Keep a root TTY or a live USB open while you test, and never edit /etc/pam.d/system-auth without a second session already logged in.
Symptom
The fingerprint reader is listed by lsusb and fprintd-enroll works, but nothing ever asks for a fingerprint: sudo, the lock screen and polkit prompts all still demand a password. Or fprintd-enroll fails with EnrollStart failed: GDBus.Error:net.reactivated.Fprint.Error.PermissionDenied: Not Authorized: net.reactivated.fprint.device.enroll.
Cause
fprintd only provides the D-Bus service. Nothing uses it until pam_fprintd.so is added to the relevant PAM stacks. Enrolment itself needs a running polkit authentication agent, and on a bare Hyprland session there often isn't one, which produces the PermissionDenied error.
Fix
WARNING before you touch PAM: fingerprint-only authentication for sudo, su or polkit is a security weakness, because a background process can obtain elevated permissions without you being prompted to touch the sensor (fingerprint hijacking, CVE-2024-37408). If that matters to you, add pam_fprintd to the graphical login stack only and leave sudo on passwords.
WARNING before editing /etc/pam.d/sudo: a syntax error there locks you out of sudo. Keep a second terminal with an active root shell open (sudo -i) until you have verified the change works in a THIRD terminal.
Install and check the reader:
sudo pacman -S --needed fprintd usbutils
lsusb
systemctl status fprintd.service
Enrol (as root if no polkit agent is running):
sudo fprintd-enroll "$USER"
fprintd-verify
Enrol several fingers:
fprintd-delete "$USER"
for finger in {left,right}-{thumb,{index,middle,ring,little}-finger}; do
fprintd-enroll -f "$finger" "$USER"
done
For local graphical login, add to the top of the auth section of /etc/pam.d/system-local-login:
auth sufficient pam_fprintd.so
auth include system-login
Only if you accept the CVE-2024-37408 risk above, for sudo. Note nullok is dropped, it permits empty passwords and is not needed here:
# /etc/pam.d/sudo
auth sufficient pam_unix.so try_first_pass likeauth
auth sufficient pam_fprintd.so
auth include system-auth
This prompts for a password first. Pressing Enter on a blank field falls through to the fingerprint. If you need both prompts simultaneously (some GTK polkit agents reject blank input), use pam-fprint-grosshack from the AUR instead.
If fingerprint works for login and sudo but not polkit prompts:
sudo cp /usr/share/polkit-1/rules.d/50-default.rules /etc/polkit-1/rules.d/
then edit the returned group in that copy to match your admin group (unix-group:wheel on Arch).
Verify
fprintd-verify succeeds, and running sudo -k; sudo true in a terminal prompts for a fingerprint (pressing Enter on the empty password field falls through to the reader).