LocalSend's firewall rule on Omarchy opens port 53317 to any address, not just the LAN
Gate 1 holds: the rule was published by third parties before this repository wrote anything about it, in PR 10766 (danjonesio, 2026-09-08), issue 11560 (CRTFD-DVLPR, 2026-09-12) and PRs 11561 and 11565, none of them authored by the account this repository uses, and the rule itself is two lines of public installer code. All three PRs are open and unmerged at the pinned sha d174d4a, which is the quattro tip as of 2026-09-18, so the defect is current. Gate 2 holds: every condition in symptom, cause and fix traces to the issue body, the 2026-09-14 comment, firewall.sh or omarchy-base.packages line 75, and the record repeats none of the comment's avahi-browse detail. Gate 3 holds, the record is a mitigation. Confirmed on this workstation: /usr/share/omarchy/install/config/firewall.sh is byte-identical to the pinned sha, IPV6=yes at /etc/default/ufw line 7, and /etc/ufw/user.rules lines 20 to 24 and /etc/ufw/user6.rules lines 20 to 24 carry the four 53317 ACCEPT tuples from 0.0.0.0/0 and ::/0. Nothing else under /usr/share/omarchy mentions 53317, so no migration puts the rule back after a user removes it. Two defects. First, verify is wrong: a rule with an IPv4 from address is an IPv4-only rule (ufw parser.py sets the rule type to v4 and frontend.py calls set_v6(False) for it), so after the fix there is no (v6) row for 53317 at all, and a reader told to expect scoped (v6) rows would conclude the fix failed. The fix's delete step is correct: ufw(8) says a delete that repeats the original rule removes both the IPv4 and the IPv6 entry. Second, severity high does not meet the brief's scale. With LocalSend closed nothing listens, and with it open LocalSend's own defaults (HTTPS on, persistence_provider.dart line 494, quick save defaulting to paired devices only, line 458) mean a stranger gets the device alias and model from the info endpoint and can offer a transfer the user must accept. No credential, privilege boundary or private data is exposed by default, so this is a default weaker than the norm, which the scale calls medium. Danger was empty and now names the two ways the fix itself bites: LocalSend stops receiving until the rules are back, and the scoped rules are IPv4-only. The title's phrase the whole internet overstates a rule that only reaches the internet on a machine with a globally routable address, but the verdict schema has no corrected_title. Not exercised: no ufw command was run and nothing on the network was probed. Re-checked against 4.0.4-1 2026-09-19: Re-checked on 2026-09-19 against Omarchy 4.0.4-1 on this workstation and against the v4.0.4 tag, sha c668141. install/config/firewall.sh at v4.0.4 is byte-identical to the installed copy and to the previously pinned d174d4a, and still carries ufw allow 53317/udp and ufw allow 53317/tcp with no from clause. localsend is still line 75 of install/omarchy-base.packages. Confirmed on this machine by reading files only: IPV6=yes at /etc/default/ufw line 7, and the four 53317 ACCEPT tuples from 0.0.0.0/0 and ::/0 at /etc/ufw/user.rules lines 20 to 24 and /etc/ufw/user6.rules lines 20 to 24. The v4.0.2 to v4.0.4 compare touches neither firewall.sh nor the packages list, and no migration in v4.0.4 mentions 53317, so omarchy update still does not put the wide rule back. The only other code path that runs firewall.sh is omarchy-upgrade-to-quattro, the one-time Omarchy 3 to 4 upgrade, which means a machine upgraded from Omarchy 3 also carries the rule, consistent with the record's every stock install. Issue 11560 and PRs 10766, 11561 and 11565 are all still open and unmerged. PR 11561 gained a migration on 2026-09-15 that would scope existing rules, and nothing of it has shipped. manual/48-security.md line 6 and manual/35-networking.md line 31 at v4.0.4 state port 53317 is the one inbound exception, which adds a documented-default source for gate 1. The manual is not installed under /usr/share/omarchy, so the record's claim that nothing there but firewall.sh mentions 53317 still holds. Severity medium and frequency very-common still fit the brief's scale. Gates 1, 2 and 3 still hold. Not exercised: no ufw command was run and nothing on the network was probed.
Deleting the rules stops LocalSend from receiving on any network until they are added back, and the scoped rules are IPv4-only, so a peer that can reach you only over IPv6 cannot send to you. Do not answer either by turning the firewall off with sudo ufw disable, which drops the default deny along with everything else.
Symptom
is it safe that LocalSend opens port 53317 on my firewall. sudo ufw status verbose lists 53317/tcp and 53317/udp allowed from Anywhere, including the (v6) rows, on a fresh install and on one where LocalSend has never been opened.
Cause
install/config/firewall.sh, run during installation, adds one rule per protocol with no from clause:
ufw allow 53317/udp
ufw allow 53317/tcp
A bare ufw allow with no from clause matches Anywhere on both IPv4 and IPv6. LocalSend ships in omarchy-base.packages, so the rule lands on every stock install whether or not LocalSend is ever launched. Many home ISPs and mobile carriers hand a machine a globally routable IPv6 address directly, with no NAT boundary the way IPv4 usually has one, so the rule reaches the public internet rather than only the LAN a file sharing tool like this is meant for. On a shared network such as a hotel, conference, or coworking Wi-Fi, the same rule reaches every other guest on that segment too, because a private (RFC1918) range is not the same thing as a trusted one.
Fix
Replace the blanket rule with rules scoped to the private IPv4 ranges. Deleting by repeating the original rule removes the IPv4 and the IPv6 entry together:
sudo ufw delete allow 53317/udp
sudo ufw delete allow 53317/tcp
for net in 10.0.0.0/8 172.16.0.0/12 192.168.0.0/16; do
sudo ufw allow from "$net" to any port 53317 proto tcp
sudo ufw allow from "$net" to any port 53317 proto udp
done
This closes the globally routable IPv6 case, the more serious one, because a public IPv6 address is in none of those ranges. Nothing in /usr/share/omarchy other than the installer's firewall.sh mentions port 53317, so omarchy update does not put the wide rule back.
It does not make a shared private network trustworthy. A hotel, conference or coworking network hands out addresses inside those ranges too. Before joining one, remove the scoped rules as well, and add them back only while you are actually transferring a file:
for net in 10.0.0.0/8 172.16.0.0/12 192.168.0.0/16; do
sudo ufw delete allow from "$net" to any port 53317 proto tcp
sudo ufw delete allow from "$net" to any port 53317 proto udp
done
Verify
sudo ufw status verbose lists 53317/tcp and 53317/udp as ALLOW IN from 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12 and 192.168.0.0/16, and shows no Anywhere row and no (v6) row for 53317. A rule with an IPv4 from address is IPv4-only, so the absence of (v6) rows is the expected result, not a failure. After you have closed the port for an untrusted network, no rule for 53317 is listed at all.
Sources
- https://github.com/omacom/omarchy/issues/11560
- https://github.com/omacom/omarchy/blob/d174d4aa279ea7393d4fad4a80fed147866106b9/install/config/firewall.sh
- https://github.com/omacom/omarchy/blob/d174d4aa279ea7393d4fad4a80fed147866106b9/install/omarchy-base.packages
- https://github.com/omacom/omarchy/pull/10766
- https://github.com/localsend/localsend/blob/230fb692962668ca22ce0e61a8f53ce1cfd32102/app/lib/provider/persistence_provider.dart
- https://github.com/localsend/protocol/blob/62bd3406ec80d62f2ed46269cdc06c4dcc391083/README.md
- https://github.com/omacom/omarchy/blob/c668141e9c42b13c80c9ca4ea108e11708c5e8a5/install/config/firewall.sh
- https://github.com/omacom/omarchy/blob/c668141e9c42b13c80c9ca4ea108e11708c5e8a5/manual/48-security.md